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Ideas. Interests and Policy Change * 
Giandomenico Majone 
European University Institute
One of the central themes of Lindblom's work is the role of 
knowledge and ideas in social problem-solving. In The 
Intelligence of Democracy he criticized the "clumsy realism" of 
pluralists like Bentley who dismiss the power of ideas and argue 
"as though minds were among the most trivial resources available 
to the group" (Lindblom, 1965:16). In his latest book Lindblom 
reaffirms his belief that "people have, for all their cognitive 
shortcomings, no better resources [than intelligence and 
information] even when their intelligence sometimes leads them 
to forswear certain lines of inquiry" (Lindblom, 1990j^2). For 
many public problems, no solutions can be found unless people are 
willing to accept new ways of thinking and new and broader 
concepts of the public interest. Hence the crucial importance of 
persuasion in all social systems and the centrality of two-way 
discussion to democracy (Lindblom, 1977: 52-54).
At the same time, Lindblom rejects the rationalist fallacy 
of believing that theories and ideas alone are powerful enough 
to determine the course of events, and of interpreting policy­
making as a purely intellectual exercise. Indeed, some of his 
best-known contributions to the study of policy-making —  the 
critique of synoptic conceptions of problem solving, the defense 
of incrementalism and interactive problem solving as alternatives 
to formal policy analysis, the emphasis on the inability of 
social science to provide an authoritative basis for policy 
decisions —  are directed against old and new utopias of a 
scientifically guided society (Lindblom, 1990: 213-230).
To appear in Harry Redner, editor, A Sceptical Child of 





























































































Between the two extremes of a clumsy realism which holds 
that ideas only reflect interests or legitimize power, and the 
notion that ideas, not vested interests drive policy outcomes 
many different positions can be reasonably defended. Especially 
in his most recent writings, Lindblom has chosen to emphasize 
power rather than intelligence, the limitations rather than the 
accomplishments of the natural and social sciences, the social 
and cultural impairment of citizens rather than their ability, 
recently demonstrated in Eastern Europe, to bring about 
spectacular changes in policies and institutions. Other authors 
are much more sanguine about the political power of ideas. It is 
not the purpose of this paper to review the arguments presented 
by pessimists and optimists. Rather, I shall argue that the 
interaction between ideas, interests and policy change is much 
more complex than it is usually assumed by both schools of 
thought, and suggest ways in which the order of ideas and the 
order of events may be fitted together to provide a fuller 
picture of policy development. Ideas and interests are not polar 
concepts. Ideas are related to interests since they are normally 
produced with some purpose in mind and also because, as Max Weber 
emphasized, ideas are powerless in history unless they are fused 
with material interests. Conversely, interests are related to 
ideas since the pursuit of interests requires intellectual 
operations like the specification of feasible goals, the 
selection of appropriate means and, especially in public life, 
the justification of both goals and means.
Rather than a polarity, ideas and interests represent two 
analytic perspectives —  different but complementary. To choose 
one is not to reject the other (Lepsius, 1986). Both 
perspectives, Weber reminds us in the concluding sentences of the 





























































































Unfortunately, not many students of public policy have followed 
Max Weber's suggestion. Pluralists, neo-corporatists and public- 
choice theorists alike, have attempted to explain policy change
as the result of changes in the configuration of dominant
interests, or in economics and technology, to the exclusion of
intellectual factors —  reasons,, ideas, justifications. However,
a number of recent studies dealing with such important examples 
of policy change as the adoption of keynesian policies in Europe 
and America, the monetarist and supply-side counter-revolutions 
of the 1980s, the rise of environmentalism, and the diffusion of 
the deregulation and privatization movements, provide evidence 
that an adequate model of policy making must include, in addition
to interests and other "causal" factors, also ideas and
arguments, in short, "reasons".
According to Peter Temin, for example, the process of
deregulation of long-distance telecommunications in the United 
States "was dominated by changing ideology, not changing 
technology. It was ideas, not things, that urgrd on the actors 
at critical points in the contest over telecommunications policy 
and AT&T's organization" (Temin, 1987:7). Similarly, the 
fundamental redirection of British public policy effected by the 
Conservative governments has been deeply influenced, if not 
dominated, by a mix of Austrian and neo-classical market theories 
and of libertarian values (Helm, 1989).
It is even possible that, at least in some cases, the 
influence of special interests and the public consequences of the 
privileged position of business (Lindblom, 1977: 170-188), have 
been exaggerated. Thus, according to the theories of "regulatory 
capture" popular in the 1960s and 1970s, regulated firms 
influence the outcome of the regulatory process by providing 
financial or other support to politicians and regulators who are 
presumed to be self-interested maximizers. Yet, summarizing the 




























































































agencies, James Q.Wilson concludes that "only by the most 
extraordinary theoretical contortions can one explain the Auto 
Safety Act, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the OSH Act, or most 
environmental protection laws by reference to the economic stakes 
involved" (Wilson, 1980: 372). Even in the case of economic 
regulation —  the case usually considered by the capture theory 
of regulation —  it would be difficult to see the regulation of 
the gas industry in America, say, as being motivated by pressures 
of producers whose best interests lay in allowing prices to rise 
to market clearing levels. The industry also opposed the 
extension of control to wellhead prices. Here, as in the case of 
social regulation or antitrust policy, public interest 
considerations seem to have been uppermost, even if the system 
of regulation of gas prices proved to be inept (Swann, 1988; 
Vietor, 1984).
Again, in none of the cases of deregulation studied by 
Derthick and Quirk did the regulated industries decide that 
regulation was no longer in their interest; nor was the defeat 
of the regulated industries brought about primarily by other 
well-organized groups that stood to gain from reform. Instead, 
these authors argue that the regulatory reforms of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s would never have occurred without the sustained 
intellectual critique of previous regulatory policies developed 
by economists in the preceding decade (Derthick and Quirk, 1985: 
238-46).
These examples demonstrate the importance of analyzing 
policy change both from the perspective of interests and from 
that of ideas. In fact, the examples show that the crucial 
conceptual difficulty about policy change is precisely to explain 
the relationship between, and to clarify the respective roles of, 
ideas and interests. However, this difficulty is not peculiar to 
our field of study. A similar problem has been discussed by 
philosophers with reference to the general issue of conceptual 




























































































philosophers in their more abstract analysis of different 
patterns of explanation.
According to Stephen Toulmin <1972: 222-23; 308-13), when 
we ask why a particular conceptual innovation succeeded in 
winning a place in a scientific discipline, two alternative 
interpretations of that "why" present themselves. We may be 
asking what rational considerations were advanced by the 
scientists concerned, to justify accepting that particular 
conceptual change. On this interpretation, the "why" is a request 
for reasons, and the reply must be given in intellectual, 
disciplinary terms, internal to the science itself. However, this 
first interpretation takes it for granted that the change was 
made "for reasons" at all. In fact, the history of science shows 
that a concept (like the quaternion in mathematics or Cartesian 
push in physics) can drop out of the reportory of a discipline, 
without the scientists concerned taking any deliberate decision 
to make this change. In extreme cases, the change may be forced 
upon the scientists by political authorities, as when education 
and research in standard genetics were virtually outlawed in the 
Soviet Union. The question now becomes one, not about 
justificatory reasons but about causal factors (personal 
ambitions, intellectual fashions, political or economic 
pressures) influencing or determining a given conceptual change. 
Lakatos' distinction between internal and external history serves 
the same analytic purpose of defining two complementary 
perspectives in the study of scientific development. Internal- 
disciplinary history must be supplemented by empirical-external 
history: "Rational reconstruction of science . . . cannot be
comprehensive since human beings are not completely rational 
animals; and even when they act rationally they may have a false 
theory of their own rational actions" (Lakatos, 1971: 102).
However, for Lakatos rational reconstruction or internal history 
is primary, external history only secondary, since the most 





























































































Toulmin is interested not only in the growth of scientific 
knowledge, but also in the organization and evolution of 
intellectual professions like law, medicine or architecture. 
Hence, for him, neither perspective can be totally prior, or 
subordinate, to the other. Whereas rational (internal) accounts 
of scientific change are concerned primarily with the outcome, 
i.e., achieved scientific knowledge, causal (external) accounts 
are preoccupied with the process of knowledge formation. Thus, 
"[w]e may .. view a collective intellectual enterprise, either 
as a network of causal processes or, alternatively, as a field 
for rational achievement. These two viewpoints are alternatives, 
rather than competitors, and we may move from the one to the 
other by an appropriate switch of interpretation. If the two 
resulting types of history overlap in practice, that is because 
both interpretations are built into the life of the rational 
enterprise itself" (Toulmin, 1972: 312).
Politics and Policy
Policy making can hardly be considered a rational enterprise. 
Nevertheless, the philosophical analysis of "reasons" and 
"causes" suggests ways of giving a sharper meaning to the 
distinction between politics and policy —  a distinction ignored 
by many languages and which has become increasingly blurred in 
contemporary political science. I believe that Lindblom's 
writings on policy making —  especially his views on 
incrementalism and on social interaction as a mode of problem 
solving —  have significantly contributed to this blurring. 
Indeed, if policy emerges, more or less epiphenomenally, from a 
series of incremental adjustments or from a network of social 
interactions, it is tempting to conclude that the process is. the 
outcome, or at least that no sharp line can be drawn between the 
two. The emphasis of much contemporary research on the politics 
of policy, i.e., on causal explanations of policy change with 





























































































The policy-making view of politics has produced important 
new insights into the functioning of different political systems. 
However, this body of literature has contributed much less to our 
understanding of the substantive implications of policy change, 
and hence to our ability to evaluate it. A practical consequence 
of blurring the distinction between process (politics) and 
outcome (policy) is that acceptability becomes the main normative 
criterion: a policy is good if it is acceptable to all or most 
of the relevant actors. This convenient criterion is particularly 
congenial to a neocorporatist mode of analysis. Its main 
limitation, however, is that it does not take into account the 
social costs and deadweight losses caused by popular, but 
substantively incorrect, policies.
Normatively unhelpful, purely causal explanations of policy 
change can also give a distorted view of the process itself. As 
John Kingdon (1984: 131-32) has written: "The content of the 
ideas themselves, far from being mere smokescreen or 
rationalizations, are integral parts of decision making in and 
around government. As officials and those close to them encounter 
ideas and proposals, they evaluate them, argue with one another, 
marshal evidence and argument in support or opposition, persuade 
one another, solve intellectual puzzles, and become entrapped in 
intellectual dilemmas.... Governmental officials often judge the 
merits of a case as well as its political costs and benefits".
Even when policy change is best explained by the political 
and economic power of groups seeking selfish ends, those who 
attempt to justify those changes must appeal to the merit of 
particular issues. Legislators, administrators, analysts, media 
experts and the public at large wish to know whether the change 
is justified. All of them seek standards against which to judge 
the success of a policy and the merits of specific programs 
initiated within the framework of that policy (Majone, 1989a: 
149) .
As noted above, a number of recent studies of policy change 




























































































adequate model must also include ideas and institutions. This new 
literature reflects a growing realization that what used to be 
called the superstructure has a considerable degree of autonomy 
with respect to shifting constellations of power and interests 
in society. In fact, the strong continuities in national patterns 
of economic and social policy revealed by those studies are 
hardly compatible with the "image of a state as a kind of 
billiard ball, pushed around by competing interest groups" (Hall, 
1986: 17).
These suggestions have been developed into analytic models 
of policy change encompassing three distinct and relatively 
autonomous, but interrelated, levels: the policy space, the actor 
space ("politics"), and the problem space (Kingdon, 1984; Majone 
1989a, 1991). The policy space includes not only actual policies 
and their institutional embodiments, but also ideas, 
conceptualizations and proposals advanced by policy actors, 
academic and bureaucratic experts, interest-group 
representatives, and so on. "Causal" studies of policy making 
view the policy space (or part of it) as the dependent variable, 
the actor space as the independent variable. In the newer models, 
both variables influence each other. For example, Lowi's dictum 
"policies determine politics" is interpreted to mean that the 
structural characteristics of the policy space affect the 
structure of the actor space, say, the kinds of coalitions that 
can be put together or the degree of fragmentation of the "policy 
community" —  politicians, citizens and experts who share an 
active interest in a given policy area. Conversely, and more 
intuitively, characteristics of the actor space (e.g., electoral 
system, form of government, etc.) influence policy outcomes.
Like the policy and the actor space, the problem space, too, 
can be analyzed in terms of various structural characteristics. 
These characteristics are important determinants of the way in 
which policy actors perceive and handle different issues. An 
interesting early example of structural analysis of a problem 




























































































(1963), where the author contrasts the characteristic features 
of the inflation problem studied in Chile with those of regional 
underdevelopment (in Brazil) and maldistribution of land (in 
Columbia). In contrast to maldistribution of land, inflation 
sends out regular signals, is measurable, and is therefore apt 
to get special attention from analysts and policy makers as soon 
as it passes some threshold of tolerance. Also, in contrast to 
natural calamities like periodic droughts, inflation is viewed 
as a man-made calamity and hence lends itself to recrimination 
among social groups. Unlike regional underdevelopment, inflation 
is formally rather similar from country to country. It has to do 
with the highly technical subject of money. Hence dominant 
economic doctrines and international experts play particularly 
important roles in attempts at solution, although both experts 
and doctrines are also apt to play highly political roles 
(Hirschman, 1963, 1981).
A detailed structural analysis of the kind exemplified by 
Hirschman is beyond the scope of this paper (but see Majone, 
1989a: 150-61). Rather, in the remaining pages, I intend to 
emphasize two points already mentioned, but which are often 
overlooked in discussions about the role of knowledge and ideas 
in policy making: first, that the relationship between problems, 
actors, policies and institutions is dialectic rather than 
monocausal or unidirectional; and, second, that ideas and 
theories are used not only to discover new solutions, but also 
to make sense of what has already happened.
The Contribution of Social Science
Both points are essential for a correct understanding of the role 
of social science in policy making. Even recent literature 
stressing the importance of ideas as sources of policy change 
often fails to recognize that the traffic in knowledge between 
social scientists and the state is a two-way one. For example, 
the model of the policy process implicit in several analyses of 




























































































professional economists and stresses the impact of expert advice 
on policy (Hall, 1989: 8). In such a model, the production of 
knowledge is viewed as an abstract activity taking place in some 
sphere quite detached from the policy process.
This artificial separation between producers and users of 
ideas not only misses the point that social scientific knowledge 
is only one of many conceptual inputs to policy making (Lindblom 
and Cohen, 1979; Lindblom, 1990), but inevitably leads to a 
systematic discounting of ideas as merely instrumental.
The inadequacy of a unidirectional view of the role of 
knowledge in policy making can be shown by comparing the 
traditional accounts of the conflict between Keynes and the 
British Treasury in the interwar period with the conclusions of 
recent research based on official documents not previously 
available to scholars.
Whereas the older accounts ascribed the rejection of the 
1929 Liberal public works program, not to the technical and 
political deficiencies of the program but, as Peter Clarke puts 
it, to "know-nothing administrative reductionism", now it is 
recognized that "the Treasury model of the 1920s has immense 
strengths, intellectual strengths not least" (Clarke, 1990: 206). 
This model was not just a theoretical exercise, but included a 
wide range of technical, administrative and political constraints 
which Keynes and other Liberal economists had largely ignored 
(Middleton, 1985; Peden, 1984). Above all, "Treasury officials 
had long understood that most politicians have a natural 
propensity to spend money in ways that will win votes. This is 
why they had developed restrictive rules of public finance in the 
nineteenth century and why they were still trying to apply such 
rules in the mid-twentieth century" (Peden, 1990: 237-38).
Eventually, under the influence of Keynes but especially of 
the unprecedented consequences of the great depression, the 
Treasury had to modify its views. In the process of adjustment 
"government may have learned from economists —  but as much about 




























































































wisdom of an administrator like Hopkins was ... a revelation to 
an economist like Henderson, and perhaps a salutary lesson to 
Keynes himself. Who learned most from whom is a question worth 
pondering" (Clarke, 1990: 206). Also the nature of the keynesian 
revolution, where it succeeded, has been widely misunderstood. 
According to the older literature, President Franklin 
D.Roosevelt1s policy of increased government spending to reduce 
unemployment and get out of the depression was inspired by the 
new theories of Keynes. But Roosevelt did not have to learn about 
government spending from Keynes. The idea that the influence of 
the British economist lay behind the policy of the New Deal began 
to take root fairly early, but it is only a legend (Winch, 1969: 
219-22). The theories of Keynes merely provided a sophisticated 
rationale for what Roosevelt was doing anyway. The answers that 
these theories provided to questions about the causes of long­
term unemployment and the reasons for the effectiveness of public 
spending were not prerequisites for Roosevelt's expansionist 
fiscal policy. But as these answers came to dominate the thinking 
of economists and politicians, they helped to make expansionist 
fiscal policy the core idea of liberal economic policy for 
several decades. In the words of a former chairman of the 
President's Council of Economic Advisers, "[w]ithout Keynes, and 
especially without the interpretation of Keynes by his followers, 
expansionist fiscal policy might have remained an occasional 
emergency measure and not become a way of life" (Stein, 1984: 
39).
That keynesian theories did not initiate a new policy of
deficit spending, but provided a sophisticated rationale for what
governments had been doing for a long time, seems surprising only
if one clings to old-fashioned positivistic views. In fact, the 
1 —7role of social scientific theory is less to provide ready-made
solutions than alternative ways of making sense of some set of
actions. To paraphrase Karl Weick, social theory makes sense of
what has been, not what will be. It is a process of justification
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himself or to those other persons to whom he feels accountable 
(Weick, 1969: 38).
Thus, the Sherman and Clayton Acts establishing for the 
first time an American antitrust policy were not influenced by 
the economic theory of monopoly, then in its infancy. Rather, the 
present sophistication of antitrust economics in the United 
States owes a good deal to the early development of antitrust 
law, and to the consequent growth of a market in economists, 
whether as expert witnesses or as policy analysts (Hannah, 1990: 
375). But this is not to say that economics did not influence the 
development of antitrust policy. On the contrary, the significant 
changes in antitrust enforcement of the past quarter of a century 
have been informed by and even driven by contemporary economic 
analysis (Williamson, 1987: 301).
Again, most important innovations in social policy, such as 
social insurance, were adopted with hardly any inputs from 
economists or other social scientists. In the case of British 
social policy, for example, Jose Harris has shown that 
information about the impact of statutory minimum wages upon 
employment and price levels only became available after the 
introduction of the Trade Board Act of 1909. Similarly, 
statistical data were almost wholly lacking before a system of 
unemployment insurance —  one of the most important innovations 
of the period —  came into operation in 1912. In both cases, 
economic information and analysis was a consequence rather than 
a cause of policy innovation (Harris, 1990: 389-90).
A generation later, the style of policy discourse had 
changed considerably. The Beveridge Plan of 1942 was supported 
and illustrated by an impressive array of statistics and expert 
opinions. Yet, Harris writes, "archive sources make it clear that 
the structure of Beveridge's scheme was fully worked out before 
a single item of evidence was gathered. Number-crunching and 
expert opinion performed an important political and rhetorical 





























































































but it would be quite wrong to suggest that they determined its 
fundamental shape" (ib.: 391).
In America, economists began developing a substantial amount 
of fundamental analyses of social security only in the 1960s —  
some thirty years after the creation of the system. Economists 
writing on social security before the 1960s either were outside 
the mainstream of their discipline or their interest was really 
directed at different, broader issues —  keynesian economists, 
for instance, who thought of social security primarily as an 
instrument of fiscal policy. Social security executives and their 
supporters in Congress could easily disregard criticisms from 
individual experts who lacked widespread professional support 
(Derthick, 1979). All this has changed with the recurrent 
financial crises of recent years. These crises and a changing 
climate of opinion about the proper role of government in the 
economy, have stimulated a much more sustained intellectual 
effort by economists and other analysts to develop more or less 
radical proposals for reform of the present system.
These examples flatly contradict a positivistic or 
instrumental view of the role of knowledge in politics. They show 
no "Eureka effect" in the discovery and application of social 
scientific theories (Harris, 1990: 394), but a slow and complex 
process of reciprocal influence of ideas and events. The examples 
also show that in societies that regularly require reasons to be 
given for public actions and possess forums and procedures for 
assessing those reasons, ideas can play a key role in policy 
development even when they do not influence policy initiation.
Social scientists lag behind other scholars in their 
understanding of the subtle ways in which ideas and events 
interact. For example, legal scholars recognize that a legal 
system includes not only legal institutions, legal rules and 
legal decisions, but also what lawmakers, judges and scholars say 
about the law. They are also aware that the relationship between 
legal institutions and legal theory is a dialectic one: the 




























































































same time those institutions, which would otherwise be 
disconnected and unorganized, become conceptualized and 
systematized, and hence transformed, by legal argument. As Harold 
Berman (1983: 8) writes, the law contains within itself a "meta­
law" by which it can be both analyzed and evaluated. In this way 
legal argument is seen as a constituent element of the legal 
process itself and the development of legal institutions is not 
artificially separated from the development of ideas and theories 
about these institutions.
Similarly, I have argued (Majone 1989a) that a full account 
of policy development must also include the "metapolicy" by which 
the process is analyzed and evaluated. The contents of the 
metapolicy —  conceptualizations, theories, arguments, norms —  
emerge from and develop along with the practical and professional 
activities in which policy makers, administrators, judges, 
experts and advocates engage. Policy development is always 
accompanied by a parallel process of conceptual development. We 
miss a great deal if we try to understand policy making solely 
in terms of power and interests, to the exclusion of debate and 
argument.
Normative Theory as Positive Theory
The fact that ideas, policies and institutions are interdependent 
also explains why in practice it is so difficult to neatly 
separate normative from positive analysis in the study of policy 
making. Consider, for example, how the two approaches have been 
used in the analysis of regulatory policy making.
The traditional "public interest" theory of regulation 
regards market failure as the main justification or motivating 
reason for introducing public regulation. This theory, which 
stems from the welfare economics of Pareto and Pigou, is 
normative in more than one sense. First, the theory demonstrates 
how, under suitable hypotheses, social welfare may be increased 
by reducing the gap between private and social costs. Second, the 




























































































welfare is an increasing function of individuals' utilities. 
Finally, the theory rests on the ideological assumption that the 
market works under normal circumstances, so that state 
intervention is justified only when it leads to a net increase 
in social welfare. In other words, the theory views the market 
as a beneficent institution needing protection as much as 
control. The significance of these normative assumptions can be 
seen from the fact that in Europe, where until recently the 
market did not have the same widespread support it always enjoyed 
in America, nationalization (of railways, public utilities, banks 
and so on) rather than American-style regulation became the 
preferred form of public intervention (Majone 1989b).
Despite these strong normative overtones, the public
1 " ^  ■ — - ■ ■ , i -  — uMwm ■ —^ ^
interest theory can also function as a positive theory of 
regulation. For example, it suggests the hypothesis that 
regulators seek, to the best of their ability, to pursue the 
public interest as defined by their enabling statutes. Because 
of this dual character, Joskow and Noll (1981) speak of 
"normative analysis as positive theory". As a positive theory 
of regulation, however, the public-interest theory seems to be 
refuted in a number of cases. Even before Stigler's path-breaking 
article on the economic theory of regulation (Stigler, 1971), 
political scientists and economists had pointed out that the 
natural-monopoly rationale for entry and rate regulation did not 
seem readily applicable to such industries as truck, rail and air 
transportation. In these and other cases, regulators had made 
decisions that, by raising prices and reducing the number of 
competitors, actually reduced social welfare. By contrast, 
regulation did not change prices in natural monopoly industries 
where, according to the public-interest theory, it should have 
eliminated or reduced monopoly power. Stigler (1971:3) concluded 
that "regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and 
operated primarily for its benefits. Stigler's positive theory 
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maximizers. What matters to each participant in the regulatory 
game is their wealth or utility, not the aggregate social wealth. 
Consequently, the real purpose of regulation is distribution 
rather than the gains in allocative efficiency that would result 
from the correction of market failures.
Despite the academic popularity of the positive, causal 
theory, it soon became clear that its predictive power, too, was 
rather limited. We have already noted that important areas of 
regulation like antitrust, environmental and consumer protection, 
or occupational health and safety can hardly be said to be 
designed and operated primarily for the benefit of producers. An 
even more serious difficulty for the theory is its failure to 
provide a satisfactory explanation of why rate or entry 
regulation is comparatively rare. Most competitive industries are 
not, in fact, subject to such regulation, even though the 
producers should find regulation in their interest. As Lindblom 
has so often argued, in market economies business is as a rule 
much more influential and better organized than consumer or labor 
groups. Hence regulation which generates rents for producers 
should be the rule rather than the exception.
Noting these failures of the economic theory of regulation, 
Peltzman (1989: 17) has observed that "[i]f there is an empirical 
basis for the normative theory's continuing attraction for 
economists, it is probably its apparent success as a theory of 
regulatory origin. The correspondence between the normative 
theory and the real-world allocation of regulatory effort seems 
striking!'.
Peltzman has also made a careful comparison of the normative 
and positive theory as theories of regulatory change. According 
to him, the positive theory can give a reasonably coherent 
account of deregulation in cases like railroads, airlines and 
bank deposits, but fails to explain the deregulation of important 
industries such as trucking and long-distance telecommunications. 




























































































have also concluded, the normative theory provides a much more 
plausible explanation of policy change.
I have contrasted the normative and the positive theories 
of regulation in order to show that even by the criterion of 
success accepted by positivists —  predictive power —  the former 
is not necessarily weaker than the latter. One could conclude 
again, as in the preceding discussion of reasons and causes, that 
any satisfactory theory of policy change should include both 
normative and positive elements. But this statement should not 
be interpreted in the sense that such a theory would be composed 
of two distinct elements. Rather, the difficulty of proving the 
superiority of one or the other approach suggests that the 
normative-positive distinction is rather arbitrary. The label 
"normative analysis as positive theory" applies not only to 
public-interest theories of regulation, but to many other 
theories of social science like Ricardo's theory of international 
trade, the neoclassical marginal productivity theory of 
distribution, the theory of separation of powers, or the liberal 
theory of the state. Such theories tend to mesh description and 
evaluation and respect neither the distinction between the order 
of ideas and the order of events nor that between logical 
analysis and causal explanation (Unger, 1975: 108-12). These 
distinctions are the very heart of positivistic social science, 
which is the reason why many social scientists tend to discount 
the influence of ideas on human affairs as merely instrumental 
at best.
The thrust of the argument presented in this paper is 
certainly consistent with some of the main themes of Lindblom's 
work: the role of ideas and of "usable" knowledge in a probing 
society; the complexity of the interplay between professional 
prober and client or public; the importance of mutual adjustment 
and the centrality of two-way discussion and persuasion to 
democracy. If the argument had any claim to originality, it is 




























































































more or less implicit, in many contributions of our author; and 
of providing additional evidence for the validity of those ideas.
I find it more difficult to share Lindblom's rather gloomy 
views concerning the social impairment of probing. Several 
examples of far-reaching changes in policies and institutions 
have been mentioned in the preceding pages. Such changes have 
been made possible not only by critical analyses of social 
scientists and other intellectuals, but also by new beliefs and 
volitions, and widespread dissatisfaction with the solutions of 
the past. Much more dramatic changes —  in fact, revolutions in 
thinking —  have taken place during the last years in many parts 
of the world: the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
end of socialism in Western Europe; the development of an 
integrated European Community; the emergence of democratic 
regimes in parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America; the end of 
apartheid; the rethinking of the role of the state in developing 
countries.
Each of these developments is a challenge to basic and long- 
held beliefs concerning historical determinism, national 
sovereignty, racial inequality or the superior efficiency of 
centralized decision making. Moreover, many of these changes have 
taken place against what appeared to be overwhelming odds. This 
suggests that at least at some moments in history, thinking about 
social and political problems is not as obstructed or impaired 
as Lindblom argues. The challenge for social scientists is to 
understand under which conditions social learning and new ways 
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